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Summary 
 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth were the subject of many 
recent theorical and empirical works [Shepherd, Hasan and Klapper, 2004; Gylfason, 2004; Rioja 
and Valev, 2003; Driffill, 2004; Haas, 2002; Carlin and Mayer, 2000].  These authors generally 
focused their analysis of the link finance- growth on the mature financial systems. As the 
Tunisian economy knew a long period of financial repression before starting the phases of 
liberalization, it would be more judicious to start by McKinnon and Shaw’s theory of “financial 
deepening” (1973) to then determinate the impact of Tunisian financial system development on 
economic growth. Indeed, McKinnon and Shaw were the first authors to analyze positive effects 
of financial liberalization policy on economic performance of less developed countries. To check 
the relevance of this assumption in Tunisian’s context, we built a model inspired of the model of 
King and Levine (1993) who by measuring instruments of economic and financial development 
appears good indicators of Tunisian economy’s financiarisation. The results of the empirical 
study on Tunisia stemming from causality tests within B-VAR framework nuance McKinnon and 
Shaw’s theorical contribution. Reciprocal relationships are only finding between the ratio of 
investment on the GDP and the loans granted to private and public sectors. The economic role 
of State is highlighted, over the period of pre-reforms as well as during the recent time.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth was the subject of many 
recent theorical and empirical works [Shepherd, Hasan and Klapper, 2004; Gylfason, 2004; Rioja 
and Valev, 2003; Driffill, 2004; Haas, 2002; Carlin and Mayer, 2000].  These authors generally 
focused their analysises of the link finance- growth on the mature financial systems. As the 
Tunisian economy knew a long period of financial repression before starting the phases of 
liberalization, it would be more judicious to start by McKinnon and Shaw’s theory of “financial 
deepening” (1973) to then determinate the impact of Tunisian financial system development on 
economic growth. McKinnon and Shaw were the first authors to analyze negative effects of 
financial repression’s policy on economic performance. They built their theory on a model which 
connects the monetary or economic growth to saving development and thus to financial system 
development.  They defined financial liberalization as an effective and simple means to accelerate 
economic growth rate of less developed countries (LDC).  This theory quickly found an 
important echo near international organizations and some LDC that started to install financial 
liberalization mechanisms:  abandoning the administration of creditor and debtor rates, 
suppression of interventions considered excessive of Official Authorities, opening of the 
economy to foreign trade...  It is still thus, at the beginning of the Nineties, where some profess, 
in front of the regression of LDC, the bankruptcy of any model interventionist and the benefits 
of liberalism. 
 
For the majority of LDC, the simple and effective solution, which enables them to leave the 
financial distress, lies in the application of the liberal model namely the installation of a process of 
financial liberalization.  Being a simple and universal concept, this process was applying by much 
country, in particular in Latin America and in the Southeast Asia; this expected to record a higher 
level of growth.  The lifting of lawful constraints weighing on the banking structure was 
established with different intensities and degrees. Nevertheless, which are the effects of these 
changes on the operation of financial systems?  Did the countries which adopted a liberal policy, 
really reach a stage of economic growth more sustained?  In the countries of the Latin America 
such as Chile, financial liberalization was total and induced with a failure resounding. The Chilean 
economy knew successive ruins of as well banks as firms. The government was obliged to re-
establish a minimum authorized capital but the credit institutions in difficulty did not receive any 
help of the monetary authorities and consequently no guarantee of the deposits of the agents 
could be assured.  As for the countries of Southeast Asia like South Korea and Taiwan, this 
process introduced gradually and involved a light improvement of the saving.  This technique 
enables these two countries to reach a stage of exceptional economic development. 
 
Tunisia also takes sides with these countries and it applied since 1986 the mechanisms of 
financial liberalization while starting by giving up the fixing of the interest rates by the Official 
Authorities, namely the Central Bank of Tunisia.  How Tunisia did start its liberal policy?  Did it 
adopt a total liberalization or rather partial? Which were the impacts of such a policy on the 
country development in other words, it contributed to stimulate or on the contrary to slow down 
economic growth? 
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To study the relationship between finance and growth, King and Levine (1993) base themselves 
on a model of growth in Solow, i.e. with an exegetic technical progress.  This approach is 
implicitly present in the empirical study of Boulila and Trabelsi (2002) on Tunisia; this study 
shows that a bilateral relation between finance and growth exists only between the credit and 
private investment during the period 1962-1997.  However, the endogenous theories of growth 
appeared in the years 1980 highlight the role of the State in the accumulation of the capital.  
Insofar as the economic development of Tunisia were done with a significant public sector and 
where the financiarisation occurred under the impulse of the State, it would be interesting to see 
whether there are causality relationship between the financial development, the private capital, 
and the public capital and if these links were modified with the reforms of 1986.  While being 
located from another point of view, we resume the study of King and Levine (1993) by 
incorporating an endogenous model of growth. New explanatory variables appear thus. The 
analysis of the relationship between finance and growth in Tunisia is carrying out through a 
double analysis: the calculation of the correlations and the estimate of a B-VAR. 
 
This contribution was organized in the following way:  section 2 clarifies the bases of the theory 
of “the financial deepening” largely developed by McKinnon and Shaw (1973), checks the validity 
of his assumptions in the Tunisian context and presents certain recent work justifying our step.  
Section 3 develops on the one hand the problems arising from financial liberalization and on the 
other hand, the debates present in the literature, section 4 formulates the empirical indicators of 
growth and the financial development and analyzes causalities between these variables through a 
B-VAR, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  A harmful financial repression to the growth 
 
The model of " financial deepening " of McKinnon and Shaw regards the monetary expansion as 
being the result of the increase in saving, which justifies their principal normative conclusion 
namely the abandoning of reaching a ceiling of interest rates in favor of their liberalization.  
According to the liberal model, the expansion of the money supply by the growth of the saving, 
is not sufficient, other measurements should be adopted.  It is in particular about the lowering of 
the obligatory reserves and the renunciation of state intervention in credit allocation, which, 
partly, is precisely made possible thanks to the seigneur age that the State exerts by the means of 
the obligatory reserves on the banking structure. 
 
2.1. The supremacy of currency in LDC 
 
McKinnon and Shaw (1973) define M2 in order to include the term deposits, savings deposits, 
currant accounts and chequebook. They consider, as in "Money in A theory of finance", that the 
request for money is a positive function of saving. They affirm that the segmentation of LDC, 
implying a dispersion of rates yields of investments, blocks the rise of capital markets. 
In such an environment, the currency constitutes the only financial asset, beside the real goods, 
being used like holds value. Therefore, the currency is the central element of the process saves 
investment and consequently the condition necessary to the economic growth.  The importance 
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of the currency as a financial reserve of value compared to other financial assets remains a 
constant in LDC.  From this observation, McKinnon and Shaw develop their research of the 
optimal management of the currency which aims at showing the inefficiency of traditional 
managements and which, according to them lead to a financial repression. 
 
Tab. 1 The currency in the broad sense of M2 in Tunisia  
(Current figures in Million Dinars) 
 
 1980 1985 1987 1990 1995 2002 
M2 1.445 3.162 3.813 5.570 7.803 17.042 
             
 Source: Financial statistics of International Monetary Funds (IMF) 
 
Table 1 shows the dominating place which M2 occupies. The evolution of M2 is marked between 
1980 and 1985 (M2 multiplied by more than twice) rather than during the period 1990 and 1995 
(less supported variation) which proves that the role of the aggregate M2 was more significant 
before engaging the reforms of 1986. The progress of an economy arouses a permanent 
movement of the currency that allows instigating the cycles of businesses.  Rioja and Valev (2003, 
2004) showed that the increasing relationship between financial development and economic 
growth is not uniform but varies according to the evolution of the countries, which depends 
mainly on economic agents’ behavior. In order to lead to this result, they distinguish, in their 
formed sample of 74 countries, three categories of areas (low, intermediate and raised).  In the 
first group, the rise of financial markets has a dubious effect on growth.  For the second category, 
the financial development has an impact more raised on economic activity.  Finally, for the last 
group, an additional improvement of financial system has as a positive effect on growth but less 
significant as the precedent.  It is for this reason that one can speak about regional factors 
influencing economic growth. 
 
2.2. The management of interest rates and obligatory banking reserves 
    
2.2.1. Misdeeds of reaching a ceiling of interest rates 
 
McKinnon and Shaw note that the high levels of inflation, which characterize the many LDC, 
push economic agents to prefer goods refuges to the currency as a value reserve. Based on this 
observation, the two authors deduce that the high interest rates are the principal condition for 
financial development and thus for economic growth.  The accumulation of a monetary saving 
supports, initially, the self-financing of projects of investment of agents with surplus and 
establishes, then, the prerequisites to a true financial intermediation: the agents with surplus, 
which invest in the improvement of their productive capital, will encourage other agents with 
surplus to lend to them.  However, an optimization of the portfolios of the economic agents can 
be carrying out only within one money market.  The economy would leave the self-financing in 
incentive thus to a better allocation of resources and a development of the investment virtuous 
cycle. On another hand, a financial repression policy combined with a strong inflation would 
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have reflected harmful successive effects. Indeed, such a policy would imply negative real rates 
((1) and (2)) and thus a reduction in deposits (5).  This situation would compromise the creditor 
activity of banks (6) while encouraging the surplus credit demand (4). The credit rationing would 
engage, in its turn, a series of indirect negative effects. On the one hand, the practice of usury 
would take seat and the political nepotism would continue more as a decisive criterion in the 
credit granting. In addition, the economic concentration would be favored since the credits 
would go preferably to large companies that, in addition to profits from privileged relationship, 
would be the only ones being able to offer under rarefaction conditions of sufficient guarantees 
credit; such a climate would discourage the innovation.   
The reaching a ceiling of interest rates leads ultimately to a bad allocation of resources, therefore 
to a deceleration of growth (11), additional source of contraction of financial system (12).  
According to McKinnon and Shaw, the reaching a ceiling of interest rates can also cause 
inflation.  Indeed, it would lead -as mentioned above- at negative real interest rates and, so to a 
reduction in the saving and thus in the growth of money demand. However, according to the 
quantitative theory used, if this growth were to be lower than that of money offer (5), the 
economy would be subject to a rising of prices (7). 
 
The analysis, which proceeds, leads the two authors to propose the liberalization of the interest 
rates like principal instrument of the "financial deepening".  The monetary assets would become, 
by this skew, of the attractive stores of value able to engage the virtuous cycle mentioned above. 
 
Tab. 2 Interest, inflation and growth rates in Tunisia (expressed as an 
annual percentage) 
 
 1983 1987 1992 1995 1997 2001 2002 
Interest rates real  -4.40 0.02 Free Free Free Free Free 
Inflation rates  8.90 8.00 6.30 7.80 4.60 1.90 2.8 
Growth rates  4.68 4.90 7.80 2.34 5.44 4.76 1.66 
Source: The IMF, INS (National Institute of Statistics)   
 
The effect of the interest rate on the inflation and growth rates well validated in the case of 
Tunisia (except the year 1995).  Indeed, any increase in the real interest rate on the deposits is 
accompanied by a reduction of inflation and an improvement of economic growth rate. Year 
2002 is remembering by a fall of growth rate 1.66% against 4.76% into 2001 following the events 
of September 11 and April 11 (the catastrophe of Djerba). Gylfason (2004) develops a new 
empirical conception of the relationship between inflation, financial sphere and economic 
growth.  It shows that the maintenance of one long-term growth justifies the top priority of 
managers namely the price stability.  
 
By looking further into the reflection on economic policies and while referring to Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000), Allen and Gale (2000), Levine (2000), we can confirm that a financial system 
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associated with an adequate lawful framework contributes considerably to stimulate economic 
growth (Haas, 2002). Vast empirical work such as those of Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2000), Beck, and Levine (2000) proved the importance of institutional aspect. Levine (1998) 
examined the positive impact of the legal environment on financial development and in 
particular, on the expansion of financial intermediaries, which allows to maintain a level constant 
of long-term growth. De Avila (2003) also analyzes the link between financial sphere and real 
sphere by examining the effect which the process of harmonization of banking rules in the 
United States on growth had been lasting these forty last years. This study leads to the existence 
of a positive impact in the long term of the capital control liberalization and the banking 
legislation deregulation. The analysis of the principal channels through which the policies 
installation can affect the indicators of growth shows that the process of harmonization 
stimulates growth via the improvement of efficiency level of financial intermediation. 
 
2.2.2. Consequences of the mode of obligatory reserves 
 
The normal use of the obligatory reserves as an instrument of monetary policy consists in 
controlling the surplus offer of currency and thus inflation. Some LDC converts these reserves of 
instrument of monetary control into instrument of financial repression. The central Banks of 
these countries impose high rates of obligatory reserves in order to financing the deficits of State 
and specialized agencies activity (3). In other words, the State exerts a right of seigneur age on 
banking structure. This denaturizing obligatory reserves function leads to credit banking rationing 
and to inflation (McKinnon and Shaw, 1973). 
By forcing high obligatory reserves to finance public deficit, the State reduces banks capacity to 
lend (9). This rationing, in addition, is accentuated by the fact that the central Bank remunerates 
obligatory reserves by very low or null rates. While thus harming the output of part of banking 
assets, the trade banks cannot offer sufficiently high remunerative rates, deposits are reduced (10) 
and credits to the economy weaken (6). Based on these observations, we can conclude that the 
coordinated suppression of reaching a ceiling of interest rates of obligatory reserves is essential to 
be able to overcome financial repression and particularly to face the problem of inflation. That is 
why the direct intervention of central Bank via specialized agencies and government itself should 
put an end to the control of inflation.  The tax reforms which aim at reducing the budget deficit 
of State, often covered by the seigneur age practiced on banking structure, are then of primary 
importance to lead to a total financial liberalization.   
 
Tab. 3 Rates of obligatory reserves and offer credit by Tunisian banks  
 1980 1989 2002 
Rates of obligatory reserves  3% 2% 2% et 1% 
Credits to the economy (1)* 1156279 4668304 17122207 
Monetary Deposits and quasi-monetary  1113696 4193862 13815479 
(1) / (2)  104% 111% 124% 
        Source:  Data built starting from the Financial Statistics of TCB and other confidential sources           * current figures of end of period in thousands of dinars
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The rate of obligatory reserves was the subject of frequent modifications according to the cash 
flow statement of the banks and the deficit of Tunisian government. Until May 1973, the 
obligatory reserves were calculated on the total of the deposits of month end and its rate was 
fixed at 8%. However, as from March 31, 1980, the deposits placed in the foreign accounts in 
devises belonging to non-residents were deducted from the plate of obligatory reserves. The rate 
applied to this new plate dropped to 3% in 1980.  From June 16, 1989, banks applied a rate equal 
to 2% of the plate consisted sight deposits in accounts resident and term accounts. Since May 16, 
2002, the rate applied to incur sight deposits is always 2%; on the other hand, the banks use a rate 
of 1% on term deposits instead of 2%. Credits offered by banks know an increase with each 
modification with the fall in the obligatory reserves rate since banks devote a less part of their 
deposits to the central Bank, if there is a credit demand. As shows it above the data of the table, 
the credit granted to the economy passed from 104% of the deposits in 1980 to 111% in 1989 to 
reach 124% into 2002.   
The strong influence, positive or negative, of the decrees of the State on the performance of 
economies aroused the interest of economists. Mayer and Sussman (2001) start from a national 
analysis of the relationship between financial development, government decisions and economic 
growth to then reach an international analysis, which makes it possible to compare a multitude of 
financial systems. Although the regulations of the adopted policies are generally strong and 
restrictive, a total prudence in the respect of aims by the Official Authorities is always 
recommended. Nevertheless, Rajan and Zingales (2003) affirm that, in addition to these factors 
of lawful origin, there are other factors, which can also justify the evolution of financial systems 
such as the creation of groups whose interest is opposing to the opening domestic economies 
and with the development of the financial systems intern likely to instigate competition. 
 
2.2.3. Evolution of financial system in a liberal economy 
 
The two preceding sections showed the normative character of the analysis of McKinnon and 
Shaw. Initially, the financial system must be released in order to reach a sufficiently level high real 
interest rate, stimulating the formation of saving and thus of money supply necessary to 
economic development. In the second time, the central Bank must use the monetary policy i.e. 
the management of the obligatory reserves only in order to stabilize the price level and not as a 
mean of financing of specialized agencies or budget deficit of the State.  It is advisable, now, to 
understand how we conceive the application of these standards in the context of repressed 
financial systems. The control of inflation by the reduction in the inflationary financing obliges to 
seek another source of financing of the governmental deficit. To manage to ensure a non-
inflationary financing of public expenditure, McKinnon and Shaw propose the adoption of tax 
reforms. Indeed, the saving does not increase at the same rhythm as the income, the government 
is then with having to choose between tax levy and board of notes to finance its deficit, without a 
suitable tax policy and because of the absence of a capital market able to finance the long term in 
LDC. Measurements described up to now allowing the liberalization of the financial system and 
guaranteeing the stabilization of the saving and its level in growth, constitute, according to the 
liberal approach, the stage avoidable of the development of long-term stocks market. The 
development of the stocks market is regarding as an instrument, which can solve the problems 
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induced by financial repression. Jayarante and Strahan (1996) prove that these problems can 
directly affect economic growth by examining the restrictions weighing on banking industry in 
United States.  They announce that the changes observed on growth level are the result of the 
changes of banking sector. The improvements of the quality of credits banking, and not the 
increase in the volume of credits banking, seem to be responsible for a fast and accelerated 
growth. However, such a strategy, namely the reinforcement of financial markets, often adopted 
by LDC in the hope to attract international investors, has like consequence only one aggravation 
of financial repression. A stepped policy appears as the only practicable solution in a repressed 
economy, which would like to obtain a modern financial system.   
Driffil (2003) re-examines this bond between financial markets and growth. The economic theory 
shows that in the presence of problems of moral risk and unfavorable selection in the financial 
transactions, the most developed financial markets facilitate the economic growth more quickly.  
However, it is less clear than measurements of financial development, largely used in empirical 
research, are adequate. The data employed cover generally a short period but, while being 
interested in the long term, the non-financial factors, which improve the outputs of production, 
appear more significant and the potential role of financial markets seems less significant. The 
question of knowing if finance and growth are bounding by, a causality relation thus remains 
suspends. 
 
Tunisia today, as the majority of the Eastern European countries of the South and 
Mediterranean, left the Structural Plans of Adjustment carried out under international financial 
institutions.  The tax reforms engaged by the government, particularly the institution of the value 
added tax (VAT), allowed an adjustment of finance public, a re-establishment of the external 
accounts and a significant retreat of inflation. Moreover, because of additional tax related to 
operations of privatization, the public deficit was brought back from 2.3% of the GDP in 1999 
to 1.6% of the GDP into 2000. Inflation and deficit were contained during the first eight months 
of year 2003 within the limits of 2% and 1.5% respectively. However, of the thorough reforms 
will be possible. The International Monetary Funds thus suggested several pasts:  widening of the 
taxable amount, suppression of the grants on the foodstuffs (with destination mainly of the 
middle class), reduction in the wage bill of the public office, etc. 
 
3.  Problems arising from financial liberalization 
 
A repressed economy is characterized by: 
• underdeveloped channels of saving and/or a negative and unstable saving; 
• financial intermediaries not ensuring an optimal allowance of the saving collected ; 
• firms discouraged from investing because of bad financial policies, which reduces the 
outputs, or make them excessively unstable. 
In front of all these distortions comes the idea to release the financial markets to support the 
growth of the investment and consequently the economic development of the country."  The 
paradigm of financial repression seems to constitute, by some aspects a grain of truth but also 
vast an exaggeration ", (Dornbush and Reynoso, 1989). Some relation-keys that melt the 
approach of McKinnon and Shaw must then be revised. 
 9 
3.1. The increasing relation between interest rate and saving 
 
The whole of the theory of financial repression supposes an increasing relation between real 
interest rate and saving.  This assumption takes only the substitution effect into account, which 
implies an increase in saving when its remuneration increases.  However, what does income 
effect happen which led to a negative bond between saving and real interest rate?  By adding this 
income effect, the relation between the two variables becomes ambiguous.  It is advisable to 
mention that in their model, McKinnon and Shaw recommend that saving is so weak in 
developing countries that the increase in its remuneration can only have a positive effect. 
 
Tab. 4 Interest Rate and Saving in Tunisia 
(Current figures in Million Dinars) 
 
 1980 1981 1983 1985 1987 1997 2002 
Deposit Rate 2.50 4.00 4.50 5.35 7.22 Libre Libre 
Bank deposits* 494729 609442 775979 1103199 1686981 5654754 10118780 
Source : IMF, Financial Statistics of the TCB                                                         * quasi-monetary deposit and banks   
 
This positive relation is well checked in Tunisia.  Indeed, the preceding table shows that, during 
the period of administration’s rates, i.e. since independence and up to 1987 (date of total 
liberalization of creditor interest rates and partial liberalization of debtor interest rates), the saving 
collected by Tunisian deposit banks rises with the level of creditor interest rates.  Nevertheless, 
are these deposits directed towards new investment opportunity?  The volume of the financial 
investments in 1997 was about 5151.8 million dinars whereas in 2002, it becomes equal to 6922.8 
million dinars.  One can thus conclude that the bank deposits increase more quickly than 
investments what means than the liberalization of the interest rates does always not imply an 
improvement of the economic situation of the country as it is the case in Tunisia.  The real 
interest rate of equilibrium can also be negative because of three factors (in addition to the 
situation of financial distress):  the demand for investment can be very weak, saving can be 
positive in spite of negative real interest rates and finally, there are non-financial distortions in the 
economy (overestimated exchange rate...). Consequently, if we seek real positive interest rates, we 
introduce significant disturbances into the economy and handicap the economic development. 
 
3.2.  Perfection of thé financial marketings 
 
The approach of MacKinnon and Shaw is founded on the implicit assumption that the money 
market is a perfect market.  Is this always the case?  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that, even 
on competitive markets of the banking financing, it could exist a credit rationed, which means 
that financial liberalization can prove ineffective. This is due to the imperfections of the credit 
market, which is the principal market. The structure of the credit markets is different from 
ordinary markets where are swapped non-financial products.  On the opposite, the financial 
markets are intended to swap funds with the purpose of drawing some from the outputs in the 
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future.  There is thus a variable defect risk from one loan to another and which poses the 
problem of the collection of information by the lender.  Does this lender can firstly determine 
with precision the risk associated to each borrower and secondly act perfectly according to the 
knowledge of these risks?  In the most probable case i.e. when the lender does not manage to 
ensure these tasks, informational imperfections can easily lead to processes of anti-selection.  In 
other words, if information is imperfect, the credit institution for example the bank can raise its 
creditor rates, will thus sanction all its debtors and give up profitable projects.  This behavior has 
two main consequences  
• firms will prefer riskier projects (high level of the interest rate) 
• bank will attract bad borrowers who will be not very sensitive to their insolvency. 
 
3.3.  The transitory rigidity of the banks and the government 
 
The rise of the interest rates induced by financial liberalization can pose a transitory problem for 
the banking sector and the government, this problem comes from the necessary time to their 
adaptation to the new interest rates.  Structurally, banks offer loans of an average maturity higher 
than that of the collected deposits.  If these loans are granted to fixed rates and rates of the 
deposits increase consecutively with financial liberalization, then it will follow from there a 
provisional reduction of the banking margin related to impossibility for banks to immediately 
reflect the increase of their resources cost.  So the banking structure can undergo significant 
losses related to its processing of maturity change and be thus in a situation of transitory 
brittleness.  For the government, the rise of the interest rates is not without incidence on the 
budget deficit.  Indeed, the public deficit can more hollow out with the increase in the weight of 
the public debt.  The phenomenon can be amplified if financial liberalization cuts down tax 
incomes taken on the banking sector or reduces the share of the Treasury bills in the assessment 
of banks.   
V R. Bencivenga and B D. Smith (1990) prove in their model that there can be an optimal degree 
of financial repression because the absence of direct financial markets doing the government to 
bailout his budget deficit.  They conclude that economies having a significant budget deficit do 
not take an interest to set up a process of financial liberalization.  Fiscal expenditures in Tunisia 
were largely higher than tax incomes what could explain the choice of the Tunisian economy to 
adopt a progressive step (partial liberalization then total).  
 
Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992) show the possible existence of an optimal degree of financial 
repression for countries where the public deficit must be bail out, issue still supported by the 
analysis of Benceivenga and Smith (1992).  Is this the best solution for developing countries?  A 
recent study of Shepherd, Hasan and Klapper (2004) allows to identify other transmission 
systems, which come from the development of the financial system and banking community, and 
to research the optimal threshold of financial repression.  The analysis of a sample made up of 49 
developed and developing countries during the period 1993-2000 shows that policies which 
promote and encourage the development of the banks of small size support the revival of the 
economic growth in the two types of country. Whereas protect them from competition with the 
products from market leads to unfavourable economic consequences. 
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3.4. The absence of an abstract financial system in the liberal model 
 
The approach of McKinnon and Shaw does not take the presence of an abstract financial sector 
into account that is one of the structural aspects most characteristic of the economies in the 
process of development.  For those who recommend the financial liberalization, this financial 
dualism is only one misadventure of financial repression and the fragmentation of the economy.  
"The abstract sector which only constitutes an imperfect substitute with indirect financial credits 
will have to face the increased competition of an organized financial sector more liberal ", Shaw 
affirms clearly that the abstract financial system loses of its importance with financial 
liberalization. 
The World Bank (1989) completely adheres to this point of view:  "The existence of abstract 
markets is often a sign of financial repression".  On the one hand, official sector and abstract 
sector would be thus substitutable and the growth of the first would lead inevitably to the 
disappearance of the second.  On the other hand, the existence of an abstract financial sector 
allows an adjustment between offer and application for the credit (Taylor 1983). Loans on this 
market are thus substitutable with bank deposits. The rise of the rates pulled by the suppression 
of the restrictive rules stimulates the growth and has as consequence an increase in the credit 
costs on this market.  It is thus not guaranteed that financial liberalization supports the growth 
according to the relative effectiveness of the formal and abstract sectors.  Far being a handicap 
for the economic development, the abstract sector can consequently urge on the growth of the 
economy. 
Using other works, we note that the presence of the abstract sector cannot block the 
development of countries; at least it does not affect it.  In this direction, Carlin and Mayer (2000) 
propose an empirical approach allowing to explain how the capitalization of countries, the 
structures of property and the characteristics of industries are related to the economic activity of 
the various areas.  Activity is measured by the volume of the shares issued on the formal market.  
Carlin and Mayer show that there is always a positive relation between the growth of industry and 
financial systems (in presence or absence of the abstract markets), but the importance of this 
relation depends on the level of the economic development. Indeed, in countries with strong 
GDP per capita, the addition of the equity results from the asymmetry of information, this 
centralizes the right of property and stipulates the engagement of the other participants.  On the 
contrary, in countries with weak GDP per capita, the banking sectors are significant to promote 
the financing via banks and the dispersion of property requires the control of the problems of 
agency. 
 
Various studies also show that the expansion of the financial system (formal banks and markets) 
can affect the productivity and the accumulation of the capital in various manners in the 
industrialized and developed countries (Acemoglu, Aghion and Ziliboth, 2002).  This assumption 
is tested for 74 countries and the results arise as follows: finance has a strong positive influence 
on the productivity growth, mainly in the most developed countries. In the least developed 
economies, the effect of finance on the growth proceeds mainly through the accumulation of the 
capital. However, in countries with average incomes and in particular with income raised, the 
financial development improves the productivity growth. 
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4.  Growth and financial development:  empirical elements 
 
Which are the consequences of financial liberalization on the Tunisian financial system?  Does it 
lead to the revival of the growth of the Tunisian economy, or on the contrary does it its 
repression?  
Numbers empirical researches analyze these effects from quantitative and qualitative point of 
view and show, in particular, the role of public capital in the economic growth. Generally, the 
results affirm the positive role that plays by public capital in the determination of the level of 
output per capita and the growth rates. Other work stresses the negative effect of high public 
expenditure on the revival of the growth. An abundant literature underlines the increasing 
relation between the effectiveness of the public capital and the process of growth. Aschauer 
(1998) develops impact of the various aspects of the public capital in the accumulation of the 
output by worker. It presents an extension of the neo-classic growth model and poses three 
assumptions.  First is that private physical capital and human capital are regarded as inputs of the 
production function.  Secondly, the financing resources of physical capital affect the level of 
productivity.  Lastly, the efficiency of public capital combined with the quantity of physical 
capital is taken into account to determine the effective stock of physical capital.  An average 
increase in physical capital financed by external debts is supposed to decrease the economic 
growth whereas a simultaneous increase in the quantity and effectiveness of public capital are 
supposed to have a neutral impact on the growth. 
 
The public sector being a deciding factor of the financiarisation of the Tunisian economy, a study 
of the relations between development of the financial sphere, private capital and public capital 
seems to be useful and necessary to understand the phases of growth in Tunisia.  The relations 
between finance and  growth in Tunisia are studied through a double analyse :  a study of the 
correlations, and an estimate of a B-VAR over the period 1963 to 2003, the variables of growth 
are quaterlied by the algorithm of McGrattan (1992) when it is necessary.  Insofar as this study 
seeks to measure the impact of the reforms of financial liberalization on the Tunisian growth, we 
distinguish two sub-periods: 1963-1986 and 1987-2003. 
 
4.1.  Indicators of growth and financial development 
 
To study the relations between the economic growth and finance in Tunisia, it is initially 
necessary to clarify the variables that will be taken into account in this study. 
 
4.1.1.  Measurements of the economic growth 
 
The economic growth is evaluated using a standard model of endogenous growth, i.e. using the 
formalization of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992).  The macroeconomic production function is a 
Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns.  So Y is the GDP in volume per capita, K physical 
stock of capital per capita, and G public expenditures per capita, the endogenous model 
of growth is written as follows:   
   Y = AKαG (1-α)                                   (1)   
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Taking logarithms and differencing yields: 
   GY =α GK + (1 – α) GG                                                                     (2) 
where GY is the growth rate of real per capital GDP, GK is the growth rate per capita physical 
capital stock and GG is the growth rate per capita public expenditures. 
              
The estimate of physical capital is that Vikram and Dhareshwar (1993), but this estimate stops in 
1990. In addition, we continue the estimate for the data of 1991 to 2003 starting from the 
traditional formulation of the accumulation of the capital. 
   K
t 
= (1-δ)K
t-1
 + I
t
                      (3) 
Where I
t
 is the investment in the year t and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.  We use the 
apparent rate of depreciation since the years 1985 in Tunisia, which is 7%1.  We also use the 
investment by product like Proxy of the growth of the inventories of capital (INV). There are 
thus four indicating variables of growth GY, GK, INV, GG. 
 
4.1.2.  Measurements of the financial development 
 
We use the indicating variables of the financial development of King and Levine (1993) with 
which we add the variables related to the financing of public expenditures by the Tunisian 
financial sector. 
 
There are thus six indicating variables of the financial development. The first variable 
corresponds to the size of the financial intermediaries.  The literature generally uses the share of 
the liquid assets on GDP (LLY) like variable representative of this size.  The second variable 
translates the importance of the trade banks in the financial system (BANK) by the intermediary 
of the banking capital ratios on total financial capital. The other variables represent the 
importance of the financing of the public and private sector carried out by the banking structure.  
We distinguish the share of the receivable amounts to the firms deprived in the domestic credit 
(PRIVATE), the ratio of the amounts receivable to the firms deprived on GDP (PRIVY);  and in 
a reciprocal way, the share of the amounts receivable in the State in the domestic credit 
(PUBLIC) and the ratio of the amounts receivable in the State on GDP (PUBLY).  The two last 
variables are additions compared to the existing studies and are the corollary with the explicit 
introduction of the role of the State into the analysis.  They make it possible to apprehend the 
role of the State in the economy since they translate the financial impulse given by the public 
sector to the growth and the accumulation of the capital. 
 
4.1.3.  The study of the correlations 
 
We can note the existence of a link between the real sphere and the financial sphere through the 
study of the correlations.  Our study shows that the auto-correlations of the same period between 
the variables financial and real (resulting from the production function) are weak even negative, 
which translates little of connect contemporary between the two spheres. Nevertheless, variable 
                                                 
1
 This rate is issued of Vikram and Dhareshwar (1993). 
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INV seems more sensitive to the financial conditions since it is correlated to 0,87 with PRIVY 
and 0,84 with LLY.  The correlations between the financial and real variables are however more 
significant during the time 1987-2003.  It is also noted that the financial variables are strongly 
correlated between them (up to 0,95).  Insofar as the frequency of the study is quarterly, delays 
can exist in the adjustments of the variables.  Therefore we examine the delayed correlations.  
The study shows that the real variables (mainly growth of the GDP) are advanced indicators of 
the financial variables: the evolution on a given date of GY predicts those of the financial 
variables on a later date.  Only the variable PUBLIC constitutes an advanced indicator of the 
growth and accumulation of capital, whether it is deprived or public (appendix 2b) which does 
not fit exactly in the optics of the model of McKinnon and Shaw.  These correlations indicate 
that it is the evolution of the real variables which determinate that of the financial variables.  
Nevertheless, the role of the State on the accumulation of the capital and the growth appear 
significant since the appropriations allocated with the government seem to support the real 
variables.  Within sight of these results, more pushed study of the relations and causalities 
between the real and financial variables, in particular the variables translating the role of the 
government, is justified. 
 
4.2. Lesson of a B-VAR 
 
In order to as well as possible exploit the results of a B-VAR, it is necessary to characterize the 
series and to specify methodology employed. 
 
4.2.1. Characterization of series 
 
A good specification of the model implies a study of the stationary character and the presence of 
a deterministic tendency. Consequently, unit root tests were carried out (tests of Dickey-Fuller 
increased and Phillips - Perron).  The results show that the real variables are stationnary except 
for the variable investment. Conversely, the results of the tests indicate that the financial variables 
are nonstationary but they show the stationary from the series in difference first.  We will thus 
use the differences first variable investment (DINV) and those of the financial variables 
(DBANK, DLLY, DPRIVATE, DPRIVY, DPUBLIC, DPUBLY) for the continuation of our 
study. 
 
The no stationary character of the series invites to seek the presence of one or more stationary 
linear combinations between these variables. However, the existence of a relation of co 
integration between the variables implies a study starting from a model with correction of errors 
and not starting from a VAR. In addition, we test the existence of these relations using the usual 
test of Johansen and Juselius (1990) of the Likelhood ratio. This test is given by the statistics as 
follows: 
 J
LR
 = -T∑
i 
 ln (1-λ
 i
)             où T is observations et λ
r
 is the Likelhood 
The results show the non-cointegration from the series except for the variables PRIVATE and 
PUBLIC over the complete period, which are cointegred with the variables of accumulation of 
the capital. These relations of co integration disappear in sub-periods whereas others appear.  
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Insofar as a study in terms of VAR can not be done using cointegred series, we chose to apply 
methodology B-VAR to the financial series, which were cointegred with no real series by a given 
sample.  Consequently, the variables taken into account are : 
• the whole of real variables (GY, GK, GG, DINV) and financial variables DBANK, DLLY, 
DPRIVY, DPUBLY for the period 1963-2003 ;   
• the whole of  real variables and financial variables DPRIVATE and 
      DPUBLIC for the period 1963-1986 ; 
• the whole of real variables and financial variables DPRIVATE, DPUBLIC, DPRIVY, and 
DPUBLY over the period 1987-2003. 
 
4.2.2. Methodology B-VAR 
 
The methodology of B-VAR (Bivariate VAR) corresponds to the study of the interactions 
between two variables.  More precisely it is a question here of seeing whether these variables are 
influenced mutually.  For this purpose, we apply tests of causality to Granger with a bivariate 
model.  A representation B-VAR with p delay, can be formulated way as follows: 
     ∑
=
− ++=
p
i
titt YY
1
εφµ  
where Y is made of two variables Y
1
 and Y
2
, µ is the vector of the constants, are the matrices of 
coefficients and φ
i
 is the vector of the not correlated errors. 
 
The financial variables and the ratio of investment on the GDP are taken of difference first so as 
to be stationary.  The test of Granger in a bivariate model indicates that the variable Y
2
 is the 
cause of Y
1
 if the predictibility of Y
1
 is improved when information relating to the current price 
of Y
2
 is built-in in the analysis. Thus, the block of the delayed variables Y
2t-i
  is regarded as 
exogenic compared to the block of the delayed variables Y
1i-1
, if the fact of adding the Y
2t
 block 
significantly does not improve the determination of the variables Y
1t
. This consists in carrying out 
a test of restriction on the coefficients of the Y
2t
 variables of the representation VAR.  If one 
writes the matrix of the coefficients φ
i
 as follows : 
    



=
ii
ii
i
2221
1211φφ
φφφ  
Granger test corresponds to the test of the following hypothesis H
o 
: 
* Y
2t 
do not cause Y
1t 
if φ 1 
12  
= φ 2 
12 
=
 
…= φ p 
12
=0 
* Y
1t 
do noy cause Y
2t 
if φ 1 
22 = 
φ 2
22 =… = 
φ p
22
=0 
 
If we accept the two hypothesis that Y
2t 
cause Y
1t 
and that Y
1t
 cause Y
2t 
, we also call of feed-back 
effect . 
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4.2.3.  Results and limits 
 
We applied tests of Granger in a structure B-VAR gathering a financial variable and a real 
variable.  We thus tested on each variable representing the financial development that this one 
caused, by the various variables of economic growth over the various periods. 
 
The results are synthesized in the tables, which follow.  They confirm those of Boulila and 
Trabelsi (2002) since they highlight a retroactive loop between the rate of investment (DINV) 
and the loans at the private sector (DPRIVY) over the period 1963-2003.  Our results show in 
addition that loans to public sector (DPUBLY) play a role in the growth of the investment since 
they also show the existence of a retroactive loop. The analysis of sub-periods indicates that these 
directional bi-causalities are recent and seem related to financial liberalization is thus to moderate 
for the Tunisian case.                 Causality tests in the B-VAR 
Period of 1963-2003 (a) 
Variables              F => G (b)  G => F 
 φ i
12 
= 0 φ i
22 
= 0 
GY DBANK 0.099 0.100 
GY DLLY 0.375 1.388 
GY DPRIVY 0.472 0.300 
GY DPUBLY 0.350 0.289 
GK DBANK 0.197 0.277 
GK DLLY 0.217 0.636 
GK DPRIVY 0.202 0.891 
GK DPUBLY 0.382 0.616 
GG DBANK 0.098 0.224 
GG DLLY 0.126 0.096 
GG DPRIVY 0.178 0.259 
GG DPUBLY 0.129 0.160 
DINV DBANK 2.819* 0.558 
DINV DLLY 1.647 2.232** 
DINV DPRIVY 2.463* 2.130** 
DINV DPUBLY 2.833* 3.345* 
 
1963-1986 
Variables F => G G=> F 
 φ i
12
 = 0 φ i
22
 = 0 
GY DPRIVATE 1.503 1.611 
GY DPUBLIC 1.579 1.541 
GK DPRIVATE 0.244 1.330 
GK DPUBLIC 0.222 1.262 
GG DPRIVATE 1.452 0.686 
GG DPUBLIC 1.490 0.649 
DINV DPRIVATE 1.329 0.119 
DINV DPUBLIC 1.488 0.111 
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1987-2003 
Variables F => G G => F 
 φ i
12
 = 0 φ i
22
 = 0 
GY DPRIVATE 0.124 0.649 
GY DPRIVY 0.861 0.432 
GY DPUBLIC 0.160 0.404 
GY DPUBLY 0.281 0.560 
GK DPRIVATE 1.148 0.594 
GK DPRIVY 1.405 1.178 
GK DPUBLIC 0.692 0.265 
GK DPUBLY 0.317 0.285 
GG DPRIVATE 0.605 1.968* 
GG DPRIVY 0.807 2.381 
GG DPUBLIC 0.840 0.977 
GG DPUBLY 0.763 0.621 
DINV DPRIVATE 1.834 4.882 
DINV DPRIVY 2.584* 2.324** 
DINV DPUBLIC 3.126* 4.136* 
DINV DPUBLY 2.887* 3.542* 
 
(a)The order of lag is determined by using information criteria; 
(b) F=Finance, G=Economique Growth 
Tables show Fischer statistics. 
*, ** significant at the 0,05 level and at the 0,10 level. 
 
As opposed to what could let believe the study of the correlations, the influence of public 
expenditures or loans granted to the State is not significant during the pre time 1986.  
Nevertheless, the impact of the budgetary decisions on the financial development increased since 
the reforms since the results show a causality of the growth of the public expenditure.  (GG) 
towards the variation of loans granted to the private sector.  Moreover, we note the interaction 
between the loans granted by the financial system to the State and the ratio of investment on 
GDP.   
The limit of the model applied lies in the absence of significant indicator of the role of the 
financial intermediation in Tunisia.  As an approach of the financial intermediation, Harrison, 
Sussman and Zeira (1999) introduced a new variable, which represents the cost of the financial 
intermediation.  The theorical part of this contribution shows how the specialization of the 
financial intermediaries leads to the development of the real sphere.  The most significant result is 
that the differences in the productivities between countries are amplified by the financial 
intermediation.  The empirical part is based on the data of the banking incomes in the United 
States to measure the cost of the financial intermediation and to prove the positive impact of the 
financial development on the real development. The authors conclude that impact of 
specialization exists and is significantly positive.  On the one hand, this variable is affected by the 
level of output due for this purpose, and on the other hand, it shows how the financial sector 
influences the real sector. 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
The concept of financial repression applies to developing countries generally characterized by 
dualistic financial systems with fragmentary nature.  This dualism results by strong rigidities and 
thus in a dispersion in the structure of interest rates real.  In absence of a liberal policy, the 
fundamental financial instrument is the monetary credit as the obvious preponderance of the 
deposit banks in the financial landscape of these countries proves it. 
 
In a repressed financial system, interest rates are generally directly fixed by the monetary 
authorities at low levels.  Financial repression can be still identified by the adoption of a mode 
fraught with obligatory reserves.  The most significant consequence of these forms of financial 
repression is the weakness of interest rates. Economic agents do not know any more where to 
invest the currency because they do not manage to obtain guide prices of the needs for the 
economy.  It is difficult to establish a cost of the capital of a given economy since there is not 
reference to equilibrium.  The strong specialization of the activities of the financial intermediaries 
and in fact of banks (deposit banks, development banks, insurance companies...) also results from 
financial repression. McKinnon and Schaw (1973) showed the harmful effect of the maintenance 
of the debtor and creditor rates on levels with the lower part of the rates of inflation.  Particularly 
when this control is associated requirements of high obligatory reserves and a restrictive policy at 
the entry, the financial development cannot be ensured and consequently we attend a decline of 
the growth.  The concept of financial liberalization appeared in the writings of McKinnon and 
Shaw presents the liberalization of the financial sector like an effective and simple means to 
accelerate the economic growth in developing countries, which, allured by the simplicity of its 
implementation, start to found a policy of financial liberalization.  Tunisia is one of countries, 
which adopted, since 1986, the optics of McKinnon and Shaw, which makes it possible to leave 
the financial distress. Nevertheless, fearing harmful effect that can result from a total 
liberalization, the Tunisian economy led with much prudence its liberal policy while following a 
step by step. 
 
In order to determine the links between the financial sector and the real sector, we validated the 
model of King and Levine (1993) but all while incorporating in it an endogenous model of 
growth being given the character dominating of the public sector in the Tunisian economy. The 
results of our estimates show that, after the introduction of the reforms initiated since 1986, the 
growth of the loans to the public sector and the public expenditure affects the growth of the 
investment positively and consequently stimulates the growth of the economic activity. 
 
The taking into account of two sub-periods aims at integrating on the one hand, the institutional 
factors that characterize Tunisia, and on the other hand, the specificity of the policies adopted by 
the Tunisian government during these two periods.  We thus took the critic of the model of King 
and Levine addressed by Arestis and Demetriades (1996) into account that re-examine the 
question of causality between the financial development and the economic growth. They show 
that the specific factors of countries (financial system based on banks or markets) have an 
influence on the nature of the relation between finance and the growth. This paper initially 
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criticizes the contribution of King and Levine (1993) which considers neither the institutional 
factors nor the characteristic of the structures of their financial sectors.  In a second place, it tests 
causality between the finance and the growth of 12 countries that defer on the level from their 
capitalizations and their institutional characteristics.  In all the cases, the results justify the interest 
granted to the institutional considerations and the structures of the financial sphere. 
 
Our study could be extended within the framework of a VECM so as to take causalities of short 
term and long term into account.  It could also return in account the new elements of research, 
which try to explain the nature of the relations, which can exist between the indicators of the 
financial sphere and the indicators of the real sphere according to different optics’ (the legal and 
lawful framework, the regional factors, the specificity of the financial systems, cost of 
intermediation,..). Indeed, although these studies generally released the existence of a strong 
positive relation between these two sizes, extension of the financial system (associate with a 
coherent lawful system) as condition of the development remains in suspends. 
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Annexes 
 
Annexe 1 : The impact of the financial repression (MCKINNON, 1980) 
 
 
 
reached a 
maximum 
interest rates
Inflation Raised obligatory reserves 
and board with ticket 
Negative real 
interest rates 
Dcredit > Scredit DM2 < SM2 
Financing 
specialized 
agencies and 
public deficit 
Deceleration of 
the growth 
(1) (2) 
 
 
(4) (5) 
(6) 
(7) (13) 
(3) 
  (9) 
(11) (12) 
(10) 
 
  (8) 
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Annexe 2a : The contemporaneous correlations 
 
   
1963-2003 
 
 BANK LLY PRIVATE PRIVY PUBLIC PUBLY 
GY -0,007 -0,132 -0,081 -0,126 -0,081 -0,225 
GK -0,326 -0,421 -0,193 -0,438 -0,193 -0,633 
GG -0,232 -0,245 -0,143 -0,258 -0,143 -0,222 
INV  0,742  0,843  0,642   0,875 -0,646   0,687 
    
1963-1986 
 
 BANK LLY PRIVATE PRIVY PUBLIC PUBLY 
GY -0,143 -0,387 -0,122 -0,385  0,123 -0,361 
GK -0,322 -0,477 -0,023 -0,541  0,022 -0,720 
GG  0,303  0,175  0,439  0,123 -0,439 -0,141 
INV  0,532  0,908  0,353   0,924 -0,354   0,856 
    
 
1987-2003 
 
 BANK LLY PRIVATE PRIVY PUBLIC PUBLY 
GY  0,300  0,077  0,318  0,108 -0,326 -0,264 
GK  0,463  0,439  0,720  0,554 -0,738 -0,365 
GG -0,822 -0,881 -0,559 -0,870  0,547   0,003 
INV -0,457 -0,535  0,324 -0,455 -0,336  -0,631 
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Annexe 2b : The lagged correlations 
   
 
1963-2003 
 
 BANK LLY PRIVATE PRIVY PUBLIC PUBLY 
GY -0,135(+18) -0,060(+0) -0,3373(+16) -0,109(+0) 0,338(-16) -0,244(-18) 
GK -0,326(+0) -0,421(+0) -0,193(+0) -0,438(+0) -0,193(+0) -0,633(+0) 
GG -0,212(+0) -0,245(+0)  0,143(+0) -0,258(+0) -0,143(+0) -0,222(+0) 
INV  0,742  0,843  0,642   0,875 -0,646   0,687 
    
 
 
1963-1986 
 
 BANK LLY PRIVATE PRIVY PUBLIC PUBLY 
GY -0,431(+16) -0,387(+0) -0,422(+16) -0,385(+0)  0,423(-16) -0,487(-3) 
GK -0,322(+0) -0,477(+0) -0,023(+0) -0,541(+0)  0,022(+0) -0,720(+0) 
GG  0,303(+0)  0,175(+0)  0,439(+0)  0,123(+0) -0,439(+0) -0,141(+0) 
INV  0,532(+0)  0,908(+0)  0,353(+0)   0,924(+0) -0,354(+0)  0,856(+0) 
 
   
 
1987-2003 
  
 
 BANK LLY PRIVATE PRIVY PUBLIC PUBLY 
GY  0,300(+0)  0,374(+14)  0,318(+0)  0,316(+13) -0,326(+0) -0,322(-5) 
GK  0,627(+18)  0,439(+0)  0,720(+0)  0,554(+0) -0,738(+0) -0,365(+0) 
GG -0,822(+0) -0,881(+0) -0,672(+3) -0,870(+0)  0,687(-13)  0,518(-17) 
INV -0,659(+13) -0,535(+0)  0,787(+18) -0,455(+0) -0,778(+18)  -0,631(+0) 
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Annexe 3a : Stationnarity tests  
 
 
 
 
Variable Lag  C/Ta  ADF  PP  T 
 
GY  2  C  -5,726  -5,095  0 
GK  1  C  -2,621  -2,577** 0 
GG  4  C  -3,100*  -4,132  0 
INV  1  C  -1,077   0,666  1 
BANK  4  C+T  -2,029  -2,663  1 
LLY  1  C+T  -1,571  -0,941  1 
PRIVAT 1  C  -2,083  -1,640  1 
PRIVY  2            C+T  -2,293  -1,917  1 
PUBLIC 4  C+T  -2,293  -1,917  1 
PUBLY 3  C+T  -1,161  -2,868  1 
 
 
aC/T : Constant and / or trend. 
The critical valeus are McKinnon values (1991) 
*, ** significant at the 0,05 level and at the 0,10 level. 
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Annexe 3b : The cointegration tests 
 
 
Variable Π0 1963-2003 1963-1986 1987-2003 
Y ; BANK r =0 9.414 19.604* 9.240 
 r<=1 0.104 2.256 0.001 
Y ; LLY r =0 7.478 29.054* 15.203 
 r <= 1 0.146 0.321 0.461 
Y ; PRIVATE r =0 12.473 7.831 4.250 
 r <=1 2.235 3.316 0.322 
Y ; PRIVY r =0 9.532 16.331* 5.955 
 r <=1 0.528 0.022 0.199 
Y ; PUBLIC r =0 12.572 7.896 4.679 
 r <=1 2.290 3.343 0.500 
Y ; PUBLY r =0 7.448 4.270 4.132 
 r <=1 2.555 0.141 0.224 
K ; BANK r =0 4.138 22.726* 9.837 
 r <=1 0.065 1.772 1.596 
K ; LLY r =0 6.505 43.894* 15.488* 
 r <=1 0.047 8.920 0.040 
K ; PRIVATE r =0 18.749* 14.913 12.203 
 r <=1 2.463 3.433 0.957 
K ; PRIVY r =0 8.388 26.001* 6.955 
 r <=1 0.095 8.578 0.461 
K ; PUBLIC r =0 19.045* 15.062 10.099 
 r <=1 2.511 3.468 1.034 
K ; PUBLY r =0 6.186 18.566* 9.829 
 r <=1 0.211 4.682* 0.412 
* a cointegration relation exists 
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Variable Π0 1963-2003 1963-1986 1987-2003 
G ; BANK r =0 7.136 10.467 17.404* 
 r<=1 1.836 0.002 3.867 
G ; LLY r =0 9.578 32.332* 15.898* 
 r <= 1 3.846 0.088 2.185 
G ; PRIVATE r =0 19.847* 10.256 13.897 
 r <=1 6.154* 0.739 1.531 
G ; PRIVY r =0 15.031 20.128* 13.491 
 r <=1 5.333 0.930 1.350 
G ; PUBLIC r =0 19.889* 10.148 13.179 
 r <=1 6.173* 0.730 1.494 
G ; PUBLY r =0 6.836 13.641 12.886 
 r <=1 2.183 0.634 1.075 
INV ; BANK r =0 7.730 6.947 17.077* 
 r <=1 1.612 0.001 1.879 
INV ; LLY r =0 4.317 25.262* 12.611 
 r <=1 0.318 4.699* 0.673 
INV ; PRIVATE r =0 12.387 8.162 11.781 
 r <=1 2.084 0.777 3.178 
INV ; PRIVY r =0 9.888 20.623* 9.453 
 r <=1 0.171 4.452* 0.221 
INV ; PUBLIC r =0 12.401 8.185 13.064 
 r <=1 2.084 0.766 3.631 
INV ; PUBLY r =0 3.773 16.585* 12.425 
 r <=1 0.399 0.050 1.658 
 
* a cointégration relation exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
